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This paper investigates the dynamics of price volatility and trading volume of 10-year U.S. Treasury note futures
within the context of transition from pit to electronic trading. The analysis is conducted over four discernible
phases of futures trading evolution: the pit-only phase, the leap to electronic trading, and the electronic trading
dominant phase, which is divided further into two periods, the before and after the financial crisis of 2007/2009.
Generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity with in-mean conditional variance and generalized
error distribution parameterization (GARCH-M-GED) tests are conducted to examine the conditional volatility
of total returns index as a function of trading volume. The empirical results show a consistently negative relation-
ship between the trading volume and price volatility for all four analyzed phases. They also show decreasing
leptokurtosis (except for the direct effects of the recent crisis), continuously high persistency in volatility, as
well as a weakening impact of unexpected ARCH-type shocks during the most recent analyzed period. Overall,
the shift to electronic trading entails a substantial increase in trading volume, but not in price volatility of Treasury
futures.
© 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Financial markets for trading futures on U.S. Treasury notes and
bonds have undergone major institutional evolution since they were
first introduced in the 1970s. One of the critical innovations has been
the transition from the open-outcry pit trading to electronic trading.
This major institutional change affected the price discovery process in
several critical ways. First, it allowed for extending the trading time
from the U.S. business hours to a round-the-clock 24-hour period.
Second, the process of matching buyers and sellers moved away from
the hand signals used by pit traders to lightning-fast electronic trade
matching algorithms. Besides enhancing the speed and the efficiency
of price discovery, the shift to electronic trading is credited with
reduced transaction costs. All of this occurred during a long, secular
bull market for U.S. Treasuries. More recently, the global financial crisis
of 2007/2009 brought about further institutional changes to futuresmar-
kets, namely new regulatory legislation in the form of the Dodd–Frank
Act. In addition, the crisis induced a considerably increased buying
activity of long-term U.S. Treasury securities by the Federal Reserve.
Recognizing these changes, this study aims to examine the impact of
the transition from pit to electronic trading on the nature and patterns
of price volatility and trading volume of 10-year Treasury note (T-note)
futures. The main investigative question is whether price volatility was
affected by the massive increase in trading volume that has occurred
with the introduction of the electronic trading. This study contributes
new dimensions to the literature on futures markets by focusing on
the dynamics of price volatility and trading volume in the context of
major institutional change. The general hypothesis is that the transition
from pit to electronic trading has improved market liquidity of T-note
futures due to higher trading volume,while price volatility has remained
relatively unaffected.
For the purpose of assessing the impact of the transition, the trading
pattern of 10-year T-note futures is analyzed over four discernible
phases. Phase I includes the pit-only trading. It captures the period
from the beginning of 1982 when 10-year T-note futures were intro-
duced by the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) to August 28, 2000 when
full round-the-clock electronic was launched.1 Phase II corresponds
with the fast-track leap to electronic trading, i.e. August 28, 2000 to
September 12, 2003 when a well-defined full electronic trading domi-
nance was reached (defined as a persistent plus-85% share of 10-year
T-note futures electronic in total trading). Phases III and IV are charac-
terized by the dominance of electronic trading, with the open-outcry
pit trading playing only a marginal role. These last two phases are
separated by the onset of the financial crisis.
The empirical tests are based on daily data for 10-year Treasury note
futures made available by the CME Group. The sample period begins in
January 1982 and runs through the end of 2011. The data set contains
information for every contract stub (maturity), every trading day, for
open, high, low, and settlement prices, trading volumes in the regular
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pit sessions and on the electronic platform, and open interest. This data
set allows deeper understanding of price volatility beyond the typical
standard deviation of price returns to investigate what was happening
simultaneously with intra-day high-to-low price differences and trad-
ing volumes. Under normal distribution assumption, there would be a
stable relationship between the standard deviation of price returns
and the intra-day high-to-low percentage price difference. However,
in this paper conditional volatility characteristics are examined by
employing generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity
GARCH(p,q) model augmented with the general error distribution
(GED) parameterization that accounts for leptokurtosis, i.e. tail risks in
the data distribution.
A continuous total return index for the 10-year T-note futures has
been constructed by the CME Group and made available for this study.
It serves as a basis to ascertain futures price volatility. This data series es-
sentially represents an excess return series above the interest onemight
earn from the futures margin account or deployment of the available
capital given the embedded leverage in the structure of futures
contracts. Notably, calendar rolls occur four times a year in Treasury
futures, and market participants typically exit the current contract
prior to the commencement of the delivery period. Depending on the
level of short-term interest rates embedded in futures prices, there
can be meaningful price gaps between the expiring contract and the
next maturity date. Simply splicing price data as the nearby contract
expires introduces volatility into the series and incorrectly handles
price returns four times each year, with some of these cases being
non-trivial for return analysis. Thus, the CME-constructed total return
index gives a better picture of howmarket participants actually experi-
ence price movements in Treasury futures, compared with ignoring the
price bumps involved in a calendar roll, as well as the more nuanced
trading that occurs during the delivery period in the last month of the
nearby contract.
Section 2 provides a perspective on the transition from pit to elec-
tronic trading along with a brief overview of the pertinent literature.
Section 3 introduces the four phases of evolution of futures trading
and describes the methodology for verifying break points between
them. The conditional price volatility analysis of the 10-year T-note
futures returns is examined and discussed in Section 4. Section 5
summarizes the main arguments and findings.
2. Perspective on transition from pit to electronic trading and
literature overview
The literature examining institutional changes in futures markets
has been extensive. The transition from the open-outcry pit trading to
electronic trading has been examined from various institutional
perspectives. The literature on this subject dates back to 1992, shortly
after the Chicago Mercantile Exchange created Globex, which was
initially used for after-hours trading exclusively and applied only to
certain selected and specific futures products. Virtually all major futures
exchanges experimented with electronic trading platforms during the
1990s, including the CBOT which operated the 10-year Treasury note
futures product.
It should be emphasized that the decision to introduce electronic
trading was not made without significant controversy. The history of
the decision process is laid out in detail byMelamed (2009). Futures ex-
changes, including CME Group, are now organized as public companies
with openly traded shares of stock, but in the 1990s both the CME and
the CBOT were mutual organizations owned by their members. And
their members, most of whom earned their livings from floor trading,
at least initially were not all in favor of the move to electronic trading
on a 24-hour basis in direct competition to floor trading. In addition,
the investment in an electronic trading platform and the software
development of trade matching engines was expensive, not easy to
accomplish, and embodied considerable operational risk. Indeed,
the CBOT used a number of different electronic platforms for its 10-year
T-note futures product during the transition period from pit to electronic
trading.
Much of the discussion in the academic literature has been focused
on trading various financial futures in three distinctive trading systems:
the floor-dominant, the hybrid floor/automated, and the automated
dominant systems. Perhaps the most discernible functional distinctions
between the floor-dominant versus automated dominant systems are
that the first one is conducted only during specific daytime business
hours and requires person-to-person interaction to match buyers and
sellers while the second one runs almost 24 h (with a short break
to reset the day) and buyers and sellers are matched with electronic
trading algorithms that operate in a lightning fast manner. Both of
these distinct differences have had their impacts on futures markets.
Round-the-clock trading does not just open up futures market for
“after-hours” trading, it reaffirms the global nature of markets and bet-
ter aligns futures with cash or physicals markets. There was nothing
stopping Asians and Europeans from placing orders before the open of
U.S. pit trading in Treasury futures, but futures trades could not be
executed until the bell rang for trading to commence. For those outside
the U.S. time zones, if one wanted to trade the market actively, one had
to trade during one's night-time hours. Initially, in the 1990s, electronic
platforms first handled only after hours trading, andwere later extended
to 24-hour trading overlapping the pit trading sessions.
The lightning-fast tradematching algorithms expanded the ability of
certain market participants to trade more actively. Again, active trading
has always been a feature of organized markets, but technology has
altered what is possible. In the pit era, active traders wore the moniker
of “day traders”, while in the electronic era we have “high-frequency
traders”. It is a natural process of the evolution of how organized
markets provide liquidity for all participants.
Much of the analytical literature was written during the transition
from the open outcry to electronic trading. This literature discusses key
characteristics of both trading platformswhile attempting –with varying
degrees of success – to identify the potential key advantages of the elec-
tronic trading over its floor-based predecessor. Ates and Wang (2005)
discuss such characteristics as faster speed, accuracy in transactions pro-
cessing, lower operating costs, open access to the limit order book, and
anonymity of trader identification. These “technical” advantages allowed
some authors to point toward the general conclusion that automated
tradingwould likely contribute to greatermarket liquidity and to a faster,
more efficient price discovery process (Martens, 1998).
The empirical literature comparing various features of electronic and
the open-outcry pit system has strongly emphasized the benefit of
lower transaction costs brought forth by the automated markets, due
to amuch faster order execution in these order-drivenmarkets. A num-
ber of studies including Venkataraman (2001), Coppejans, Domowitz,
and Madhavan (2006), as well as Tse and Bandyopadhyay (2006) indi-
cate that cost savings from moving to automated from the open-outcry
markets can be passed onto market participants in the form of lower
fixed transaction costs. In addition, Gutierrez and Tse (2009) argue
that the electronic trading systems entail lower inventory control costs.
The open access to limit order books and the anonymity of trader
identification in electronic markets are related to the major difference
in information extraction in the open-outcry versus electronic markets.
In floor-based trading, the pit traders and floor brokers know and select
each other, while they remain anonymous in a global electronic frame-
work. Following this notion, Theissen (2003) makes an interesting
observation that informed traders prefer to transact in an automated
market, because they have incentives to hide and remain anonymous.
Moreover, limit order traders in automated markets take advantage of
volatility information. Foucault, Moinas, and Theissen (2007) examine
whether limit order traders formulate information about future volatil-
ity on the basis of the bid–ask spread. They find that the average quoted
spreads are smaller when limit order traders' identifiers are concealed,
as the lower spreads may reduce their expectations about future
volatility.
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Other widely-debated advantages of electronic markets focus on the
price discovery and the transactions matching process. Among others,
Ates and Wang (2005) indicate that the algorithm matching protocol
in electronic markets allows for a closer alignment of exchange
counterparties. As a result, the faster transactions' execution ultimately
lowers the execution risk and the order processing costs. In a different
vein, Brandt, Kavajecz, and Underwood (2007) argue that price discov-
ery in both Treasury futures and cash markets is driven mainly by a
number of ‘environmental’ factors such as the trader type, financing
rates and liquidity.
The literature also discusses the possibility, however, of several
potential drawbacks of electronic trading in relation to the open-
outcry trading pit. The most widely debated presumed disadvantage
of electronicmarkets a possibly heightened volatility and greater uncer-
tainty of returns (Aitken, Almeida, Harris, de, & McInish, 2007; Aitken,
Frino, Hill, & Jarnecic, 2004; Tse & Zabotina, 2001). An early study by
Martens (1998) argues that automated markets result in larger trading
volumes and in potentially higher volatility, particularly at stressful
market periods. This stems from a more open and faster access by a
broad spectrum of global investors in various types of financial futures
(Gutierrez & Tse, 2009). Of course, the cause that generates the stressful
period is theultimate source of the volatility, and larger trading volumes
and more liquid markets may well have allowed for considerably more
rapid adjustment to the shock that caused the market volatility in the
first place.
While the literature written during the transition period from pit
to electronic trading raised some interesting points and contained a
number of key insights, much of it was merely hypothetical because
the transition was still in progress. This study, through its examination
of the evolution of futures trading benefits from a longer data period
that allows to analyze trading volume and price volatility under both
floor-based and electronic trading platforms.
3. Evolution of Treasury futures trading: four discernible phases
The data for this research has been provided by the CME Group as
part of their “End of Day” data packages for their futures products. The
data available for 10-year T-note futures contains daily data from the
regular pit trading session from the beginning of the data set in 1982
through the end of 2011. The data includes the settlement price, high
price during the session, low price during the session, and trading
volume. For the 24-hour electronic sessions, the data set commences
at the end of August 2000, with the electronic sessions overlapping
the regular hours of the pit sessions. As in the case for the pit sessions,
the data for the electronic platform includes the settlement price
and trading volume. The settlement procedure is such that the daily
settlement prices are identical for both pit and electronic trading. The
data set does not include prices for the after-hours electronic sessions
that were introduced by the CBOT for Treasury futures in 1994. Trading
information is not separated into pit and electronic session data until
August 2000. To better mimic the price returns actually experienced
by futures market participants, a long-only total return series has been
created. This series handles the contract roll at the end of the month
prior to the expiration of the contract and before the start of the delivery
notice period.
In this paper, the evolution of the 10-year Treasury note futures
market is divided into four distinct phases. These sub-periods have
been determined through Chow Breakpoint tests in the data series
reflecting the share of electronically traded 10-year T-note futures
volume as a percent of total trading volume as shown in Fig. 1. The
four phases are:
1. Pit-only phase. The period of exclusive CBOT floor-based trading runs
from the inception of the 10-year Treasury note futures trading on
May 3, 1982 to August 27, 2000 when the 10-year T-note futures
were placed on a 24-hour electronic trading platform by the CBOT.
2. Leap to electronic trading. During this hybrid, transitional phase, elec-
tronic trading gained traction at a rapid pace. Active trading in both
the pit session and on the electronic trading system co-existed
from August 28, 2000 (4% share trading on the electronic platform)
to September 11, 2003 (share of electronic trading reaching plus-85%
on a persistent basis).
3. Electronic dominant trading. This phase epitomized well-established
electronic trading system that ran from September 12, 2003 to
November 26, 2007. The end-point coincides with a major, tempo-
rary disruption in the electronic share from 99% to 90% that was
induced by the U.S. subprime mortgage debacle spreading through
the financial system. In an important note, during this period CME
and CBOT merged to form the CME Group in October 2006. The
electronic platformwas eventually switched to CME's Globex during
2007.
4. Electronic dominant with limited pit trading. This period coincides
with the global financial crisis that persisted from November 27,
2007 through December 30, 2011 (the end of our sample period).
While electronic trading remained dominant, there was a limited
revival of pit trading that stemmed from the elevated systemic risk
crisis. The resurgence of traditional trading, especially in a crisis
period, was in part potentially related to the benefits of human
intermediation on a trading floor over the lack of it in the electronic
only trading2.
The cutoff date of September 12, 2003, i.e. between the end of Phase
II and the starting point of Phase III has been determinedwith the Chow
Breakpoint Test conducted for the percentage share of electronic
trading with the linear time trend for the entire sample period (see
Table 1). The November 26, 2007 breakpoint between Phase III and
Phase IV has been also identified with the Chow test for the sample pe-
riod between September 12, 2003 and December 31, 2011. Its timing
roughly coincides with the recognition that the recent financial crisis
was no longer confined merely to the subprime mortgage demise but
it was reverberating rapidly across global financial markets3.
One note here is that there are down spikes in the share of electronic
volume every three months. These down spikes in electronic volume
and increased pit activity are associated with roll periods. In hindsight,
traders handle the calendar roll differently than normal trading activity,
and when traders and investors are rolling from one maturity that is
expiring into the next, there is an increase in pit activity even in the
0.0
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1.0
82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
Phases: I II III IV
8/28/2000 9/12/2003 11/26/2007
Fig. 1. Share of 10-year T-note Futures trading volume on electronic (Globex) platformas a
percent of total trading volume. May 3, 1982–December 31, 2011 sample period. Source:
Author's own estimation based on CME Group data.
2 The benefits of human intermediation, i.e. thefloor trading, have been discussed in the
earlier literature byVenkataraman (2001), among others. Chief among them is verification
of data accuracy, including pricing.
3 For a comprehensive examination of stages of proliferation of the recent global finan-
cial crisis see Orlowski (2008).
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electronic era. In the 10-year T-note futures market, one has to signal
the intent to deliver the physical securities at the start of the last
month of the contract. Thus, for example, the March contract would
end normal trading in February and start its delivery period during
the first days of March, and similarly, for the June, September, and
December contracts, since the Treasury futures trade on a quarterly
contract cycle. The roll period into the new to be “nearby” contract
occurs toward the end of themonth before contract maturity or expira-
tion, and it is then that the pit trading retains some role in the price
discovery process even in the electronic era.
Some discernible changes in trading volumes and open interest that
have accompanied the move to the electronic era are shown in Table 2.
The open interest and trading volume data show sharp contrasts during
the examined sample periods, reflecting a rapid institutional advance-
ment of the 10-year T-note futures market. Notably, the average open
interest in Phase IV (2008–2011) is 15 times higher than the pit trading
era (1982–2000), while trading volumes are 18 times higher, for the
same period averages. The average open interest during the first
business 60-days increased from a “miniscule” 17 thousand during the
pit-only phase, to close to 4 million during the most recent period.
Another noteworthy observation is the considerably higher ratio of
the average open interest during the last 60 business days to the overall
open interest in Phase III (3.4 to 1.9 million) than in Phase IV (3.0 to 3.2
million), which reflects a somewhat weaker position of rolls during the
most recent period. While the number of open interest, i.e. outstanding
contracts held by investors at the end of each day, has increased consid-
erably, their variability, or more specifically, the average daily disper-
sion from the mean as reflected by the coefficient of variation fell from
0.91 (or 91%) in Phase I to 0.24 in Phase II. It gradually increased to
0.27 in Phase III and 0.34 in Phase IV. It can be therefore argued that
the introduction of electronic trading has dampened the overall
variability of open interest, consistently with the initial intensions of
the Globex platform architects (see Melamed (2009)). Similarly, the
average daily dispersion of daily trading volumes fell from 1.06 during
the pit-only period to a sustainable 0.49 in Phases III and IV. Moreover,
the proportion of trading volumes during the last 60 business days to
the overall daily average volumes was overwhelmingly greater in
Phase I (155/55 ratio), significantly larger in Phases II and III, but smaller
in Phase IV (1015/1075 ratio), which further underpins stability gains in
the examined Treasury futures market brought forth by the Globex
trading.
While the volatility of daily returns in the 10-year T-note futures
market appears fairly stable in terms of averages for each period, rang-
ing from a high of 8.17% annualized standard deviation in Phase IV to a
low of 6.12% in Phase III, this obscured many shorter time frames of
much higher or lower volatility. Fig. 2 shows the rolling one-quarter
(65 business days) annualized volatility. This time pattern underpins
our claim that the shift to electronic trading of 10-year T-note futures
has no discernible impact on their daily returns. As expected, their vol-
atility has been recently elevated during the peak of the global financial
crisis in the last quarter of 2008.
In short, there was a great deal of market action during the period
under study, as trading evolved from pit to electronic sessions.
Further insights to the impact of trading on electronic platforms
on liquidity and volatility of the 10-year T-note futures market can
be detected from the analysis of bivariate reactions between the per-
centage share trading on electronic systems and, separately, the total
trading volume, open interest and the rolling volatility measure
discussed above. Scatterplots of these reactions are shown in
Fig. 3A–C. In these figures, the Epanechnikov kernel smoother is ap-
plied; it brings the set of noisy data points into a smooth, high-trace
line reflecting a functional association between the pairs of the ex-
amined variables.
As shown in this set of scatterplots, a higher share of electronic trad-
ing is associated with a sharp increase in open interest (Fig. 3B) and an
increase in total trading volume (Fig. 3A), as highlighted by the rising
kernel fit functions. In contrast, there is no discernible relationship
between the higher share of electronic trading and the price volatility
index (Fig. 3C). In particular, sharp increases in open interest and in
trading volume are detected once the share of electronic trading
exceeds 70%, with an explosive impact on open interest once it exceeds
85%. This highlights significant liquidity increases brought forth by
electronic trading, particularly at the advanced stages of transition
from pit to electronic trading (Phases III and IV).
Table 1
Chow Breakpoint Test summary statistics.
Breakpoints: F-statistics Log likelihood ratio
September 12, 2003 15,507 7065
November 26, 2007 397 675
Source: Author's own estimation based on CME Group data.
Table 2
10-year T-note Futures open interest and trading volumes.
Trading characteristics NNN Pit trading only Leap to electronic
trading
Electronic dominant
trading
Electronic dominant
with limited pit
Dates of period NNN 3 May 1982–27
Aug 2000
28 Aug 2000–11
Sep 2003
12 Sep 2003–26
Nov 2007
27 Nov 2007–31
Dec 2011
Open interest I II III IV
Open interest during first 60 business days of the period (average of daily data,
number of contracts)
17,381 559,267 991,186 3,988,858
Open interest during last 60 business days of the period (average of daily data,
number of contracts)
599,417 989,853 3,393,939 2,987,847
Average open interest during the period, number of contracts 197,835 730,528 1,928,875 3,190,296
Standard deviation of daily open interest over the period, number of contracts 180,784 174,199 520,301 1,073,790
Coefficient of variation 0.91 0.24 0.27 0.34
Trading volume I II III IV
Trading volume during first 60 business days of the period (average of daily data,
number of contracts)
6286 191,625 655,642 1,376,938
Trading volume during last 60 business days of the period (average of daily data,
number of contracts)
155,076 658,037 1,370,109 1,015,198
Average trading volume during the period, number of contracts 55,489 357,967 940,297 1,075,025
Standard deviation of daily trading volume over the period, number of contracts 58,817 199,272 461,667 530,810
Coefficient of variation 1.06 0.56 0.49 0.49
Note: The notional value of one contract is US$ 100,000 assuming a price of par or 100.
Data source: Futures volume and open interest data provided by the CME Group.
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A general conclusion from the above analysis is that the transition
from pit to electronic trading has brought forth a considerable increase
in liquidity in the 10-year T-note futures market, but not a discernible
increase in volatility. I now proceed to a deeper investigation of
volatility dynamics by employing GARCH(p,q) tests augmented with
the generalized error distribution (GED) parameterization for each of
the analyzed phases.
4. Impact on price volatility: GARCH-M-GED analysis
Price volatility of 10-year T-note futures is examined with the gener-
alized autoregressive conditional GARCH(p,q) model augmented with
the in-mean GARCH variance M and generalized error distribution GED
parameterization. The in-mean variance allows for assessing the impact
of a (one-period-lagged) conditional volatility on the volatility of returns,
and the GED parameterization relaxes a rigid, normal (Gaussian) distri-
bution assumption, reflecting the scope of leptokurtosis, i.e. long-tails
in the examined series. The GARCH-M-GED process consists of a two-
step procedure that includes the conditional mean and the conditional
variance equations.
The conditional mean equation is specified as:
Δ PVTtð Þ ¼ γ0 þ γ1Δ TVOLtð Þ þ γ2Δ log σ2t−1
 
þ μ t : ð1Þ
The corresponding conditional variance equation is stated as:
σ2t ¼ h0 þ h1μ2t−1 þ…þ hpμ2t−p þ ν1σ2t−1 þ…þ νqσ2t−q: ð2Þ
The price volatility series PVTt is a regressant, and the daily average
trading volume TVOLt as well as the lagged squared GARCH conditional
variance term log σt − 12 are regressors in the conditional mean Eq. (1).
The PVTt series is constructed as the square root from the squared daily
difference in the CME excess returns index ERINDt for 10-year T-note
futures. Therefore, PVTt is calculated as:
PVTt ¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
ERINDt−ERINDt−1ð Þ2
q
: ð3Þ
In the conditional variance Eq. (2) innovations or shocks to volatility
are represented by p-order ARCH terms hpμ t − p2 and the persistency in
volatility is reflected by q-order GARCH terms νqσ t − q2 .4 To account for
leptokurtosis in the data, the model includes general error distribution
(GED) parameterization. If the estimated GED parameter is less than 2
and closer to 0, the price volatility process has a leptokurtic “heavy-
tailed” or “outlier-prone” distribution. The heavy-tailed distribution
means that volatility of the examined data series is subdued (oscillating
around the mean) at normal market periods, but it tends to explode at
turbulent times, reflecting prevalence of extrememarket risk. Outbursts
of such risk have been recently quite pronounced during the recent
global financial crisis. As demonstrated by Orlowski (2012), during the
recent global financial crisis extrememarket risks have been particularly
predominant in interbank credit markets, while somewhat less endemic
in equity and foreign exchangemarkets. Inclusion of the GEDparameter-
ization in the GARCH process is justified by the ubiquitous character of
tail risks in financial markets. Moreover, such extreme market risks
Fig. 2. Rolling volatility of 10-year T-note Futures daily returns.
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Fig. 3. A. Total trading volume of 10-year T-note Futures (left scale) in relation to percent-
age share of Globex Trading (Bottom Scale). Scatterplot with Kernel Fit (solid) Line. B:
Open interest (left scale) in relation to percentage share of Globex Trading (Bottom
Scale). Scatterplot with Kernel Fit (solid) Line. C: Price volatility index (left scale) in rela-
tion to the percentage share of Globex Trading (bottom scale). Scatterplot with Kernel Fit
(solid) Line. Source: Author's own estimation based on CME Group data.
4 Applications of GARCH-class tests for measuring volatility of U.S. Treasury futures
markets have been pioneered by Li and Engle (1998), who devised a forecast model of fu-
tures prices based on macroeconomic announcement variables.
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have remained uplifted by ultra-easy monetary policies pursued by the
Federal Reserve and other central banks (Putnam, 2013; White, 2012).
In addition, themodel is aimed at examiningwhether an increase in
conditional volatility, i.e. in a one-period lagged conditional variance, is
associated with lower or higher price volatility. To capture this effect,
themodel includes the (log) of the GARCH variance (theM component)
in the conditional mean equation. In essence, a negative sign of the
GARCH variance coefficient implies price volatility compression in the
presence of increasing conditional volatility of the examined series.
The empirical tests of the model specified by Eqs. (1) and (2) are
shown in Table 3. The tests are conducted for each one of the four phases
and separately for the entire sample period ofMay 3, 1982–December 31,
2011. As noted above, the empirical tests are based on a set of daily data.
All the tests involve stationary dependent and independent variables. The
ARCH and GARCH orders for each of the tests are optimized by minimiz-
ing the Schwartz Information Criterion. All variables are entered in their
first-differences in order to ensure their stationarity.
The GARCH conditional mean equation estimation generates several
meaningful results. Throughout the entire sample period and during
each of the four examined phases, higher trading volumes are associated
with rising price volatility, as implied by the positive values of the
estimated γ1 coefficients. This shows that higher trading volumes tend
to drive up price volatility. This positive relationship is understandable,
as investors normally use Treasury bonds and futures for the purpose
of reducing volatility of their portfolios and increasing predictability of
cash flows. Thus higher volatility induces investors to buy these securi-
ties, which in turn drives up their prices. Notably, this positive functional
relationship is the most significant in the pit-only Phase I. It is still pro-
nounced in Phases II and III, while in Phase IV this link is the weakest
and statistically insignificant. The estimated in-mean GARCH variance
coefficients are consistently negative and statistically significant in all
four phases, indicating that elevated volatility in the previous day tends
to decrease the price volatility in the following day. This observation
may be related to the “risk-on, risk-off” nature of trading environments
in the Treasury futures market, not really attributable to electronic
trading.
The conditional variance equation provides a number of insights on
specific features of volatility. Especially interesting is the changing pat-
tern of unexpected shocks to volatility reflected by the lagged ARCH
terms. First-order ARCH(1) shocks to volatility are highly significant in
all four phases. Moreover, positive coefficients of ARCH(1) and negative
coefficients of ARCH(3) terms have roughly the same absolute values,
which suggests a two-day nearly complete diffusion of positive shocks.
This effect seems to be prevalent duringmore turbulentmarket periods,
as it is relatively less significant in a more tranquil Phase III. In addition,
the diffusion seems to be a bit more rapid in Phase III than in Phases I
and II, as inferred by the significant, negative ARCH(2) term. This con-
firms what many researchers thought would happen in the electronic
era – namely, that the impact of a given event or shock tomarkets is dis-
persed more immediately, as information flows faster to traders. More-
over, the conditional volatility is highly persistent, as implied by the
GARCH(1) coefficients that are all close to the unity, with a notable ex-
ception of themost recent Phase IV. Theweaker persistency in volatility
during the recent period seems to be attributed to the market turbu-
lence and elevated risks during the global financial crisis.
A particularlyworth notingfinding is that the estimatedGEDparam-
eter for the pit-only phase is much lower than that for the remaining
phases. This suggests that tail risks in the price volatility series were
much stronger in the floor trading era than in the electronic era. This
finding dismisses the early fears of many traders that the introduction
of Globex would entail increasing volatility and extreme market risks
in the Treasury futures markets (Melamed, 2009). Nevertheless, the
GED parameter is lower in Phase IV than in Phase III. Thus in the period
affected by the crisis induced financial shocks, the volatility series distri-
bution became more leptokurtic, with fatter tails in both directions. Ar-
guably, trading of 10-year T-note futures tends to be increasingly
volatile at turbulent market (i.e. financial distress) periods as investors
exercise flight-to-quality, while volatility remains subdued at more
tranquil times.
The price volatility patterns are further highlighted by the GARCH
conditional variance generated from the entire sample period estima-
tion, which is shown in Fig. 4. The conditional volatility was very
pronounced at the early stage of the pit-only Phase I (1982–1987).
The volatility was considerably lower during the following 13-year
period, although there were several noticeable “jumps” indicating
high susceptibility to tail risks. It should be emphasized that the
GARCH conditional variance series has not changed in Phase II, i.e. the
leap to electronic trading, relative to Phase I. Notably, the examined
volatility was clearly the lowest during the Globex-dominant Phase III.
As it could be expected, the volatility was considerably elevated in
Phase IV, with large increases at the peak of the financial crisis in
September/October of 2008, and the largest single-day jump on March
18, 2009 coinciding with a sudden, unexpected increase in the price of
10-year Treasury note. Toward the end of Phase IV, in post-crisis period,
the examined volatility has resumed its average historical pattern.
In sum, price volatility of 10-year Treasury note futures has been
continuously associated with higher trading volumes during transition
from pit to electronic trading. In the course of this transition, the
Table 3
GARCH(p,q)-M-GED tests (Eqs. (1) and (2)). Dependent variable: Daily change in price volatility of 10-year T-note futures Δ(PVTt). Sample period: May 3, 1982–December 31, 2011.
Variables: Phase I Phase II Phase III Phase IV Entire period
Cond.mean equation:
Constant term −0.0088*** (−7.37) −0.0163*** (−3.78) −0.0073*** (−2.97) −0.0087** (−2.49) −0.0070*** (−7.94)
Δ log(TVOLt) 0.00076*** (7.58) 0.00076** (2.05) 0.00083*** (3.72) 0.00026 (0.71) 0.00076*** (8.78)
Log GARCH −0.00078*** (−7.31) −0.00147*** (−3.76) −0.00062*** (−2.94) −0.00081** (−2.47) −0.00062*** (−7.88)
Cond. variance equation:
Const. 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000***
ARCH(1) 0.241*** 0.206*** 0.294*** 0.144*** 0.229***
ARCH(2) 0.002 0.089 −0.165 0.112 0.008
ARCH(3) −0.201*** −0.240*** −0.110*** −0.245*** 0.199***
ARCH(4) NA NA NA 0.081** NA
GARCH(1) 0.951*** 0.907*** 0.978*** 0.876*** 0.957***
GED parameter 1.467*** 1.616*** 1.637*** 1.545*** 1.495***
Diagnostic statistics:
SIC −8.084 −7.984 −8.620 −7.643 −8.106
Sum sq. resid. 0.102 0.016 0.012 0.032 0.162
Log likelihood 18,696 3064 4522 3982 30,238
#observations 4616 760 1042 1033 7451
Notes: Z-statistics are in parentheses; SIC = Schwartz Information Criterion; *** indicates significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%; NA = not applied due to sub-optimally high ARCH order.
Source: Author's own estimation based on CME data.
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conditional volatility pattern shows a faster diffusion of ARCH-type
shocks and a somewhatweaker persistency. In Phase IV volatility is sub-
ject to more pronounced extreme risks, although this effect results very
likely from a significant risk proliferation in all financial markets during
the recent financial crisis.
5. A synthesis
The transition from pit to electronic trading was quite rapid, taking
just less than three years for electronic trading to establish clear domi-
nance. The key argument of our study is that the move to electronic
trading of 10-year Treasury note futures was accompanied by substan-
tial increases in both the trading volume and the levels of open interest,
but not in price volatility. This effect is shown in Fig. 3A–C. It is further
proven by the GARCH empirical tests of Eqs. (1) and (2), and by the
GARCH conditional variance series shown in Fig. 4. The increases in
trading volume and open interest can be attributed to: (1) the increased
globalization of the market with near 24 h trading in the electronic
era, as well as to the (2) joint impact of the lightning speed of trade
matching engines coupled with lower transactions costs, allowing for
more rapid or high frequency trading.
Across all analyzed periods, the days with higher trading volumes
are associated with higher price volatility. That is, external shocks or
surprises that hit the Treasury futures market simultaneously generate
a greater propensity for price jumps (discontinuities) at the same time
as trading volumes spike higher. Moreover, the obtained positive rela-
tionship between price volatility and trading volume is plausible since
investors normally use Treasury bonds and bond futures for the purpose
of reducing volatility of their portfolios and increasing predictability of
cash flows.
The relationship between trading volumes and price volatility
changed with transition to electronic trading. Volatility was the lowest
during the Globex-dominant Phase III. This reflects a faster growth
in trading volumes than in open interest and it can be generally
interpreted as another manifestation of the greater liquidity and lower
transaction costs available in the electronic era.
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Fig. 4. GARCH conditional variance. Note: The GARCH conditional variance series is
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